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Abstract. Shows that both anaphoricity and egocentric de se binding
play a crucial role in the interpretation of tense in discourse. Uses the
English backwards shifted reading of the past tense in a mistaken time
scenario to bring out the tension between these two features. Provides
a suitable representational framework for the observed clash in the form
of an extension of DRT in which updates of the common ground are
accompanied by updates of each relevant agent’s complex attitudinal
state.
1 Introduction
The challenge of this paper is to deal with the interpretation of the embedded
past tense in past-under-past sentences like (1):
(1) Sam said that she was in London.
This sentence has two readings, a simultaneous reading, where Sam said I am
in London, and a backward shifted reading, where she said I was in London. We
show that the interpretation of the embedded past tense on the latter reading
combines two independent features of tense interpretation: anaphoricity and de
se binding. There is however a tension between these two features: anaphoricity
means that the interval introduced by the tense morpheme is bound to a salient
past time, whereas de se interpretation implies that it is trapped by the local
now. In other words, the interpretation of tense seems to be both “wide” and
“narrow” at the same time.
Current frameworks tend to focus on one of these features at a time and are
unable to deal with the combination of the two. In this paper, we propose a new
dynamic framework to solve this problem.
⋆ We thank Nick Asher, Rob van der Sandt, and Hans Kamp for insightful comments.
We also thank the organizers and audience of LENLS 2008, Asahikawa. Emar Maier
is supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), grant
446-07-004.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we formulate the challenge. We
establish two distinct features of tense interpretation in general, anaphoricity in
2.1 and de se binding in 2.2, and show that the two come together in the case
of the backward shifted interpretation of sentences like (1) (2.3). In section 3 we
present an analysis that resolves the tension.
2 Challenge: two distinct features of tense interpretation
2.1 Anaphoricity
On the basis of examples like (2) and (3), Partee (1973) argues that tenses behave
like pronouns, in that both are anaphoric:
(2) Sheila owns a donkey. She likes it.
(3) Sheila had a party on Monday. Sam got drunk.
In (2) the pronoun she picks up Sheila and it the donkey introduced by the first
sentence. In the same way the time of Sam’s getting drunk in (3) is not some
arbitrary time before the utterance time, but picks up the time of the party on
Monday.
Similarly, the phenomenon of narrative progression is often, in one way or
another, attributed to the anaphoric nature of tense (Partee 1984, Hinrichs 1986,
Kamp and Reyle 1993):
(4) Sheila walked into the room. She sneezed.
Again, the time of Sheila’s sneezing is not some arbitary time in the past of the
utterance time. Instead, the natural interpretation is that Sheila sneezed after
her entrance. One way to obtain this result is to let the first sentence introduce
an interval after Sheila’s entrance and treat the sneezing time as an anaphor
that binds to this interval (cf. Partee 1984, Hinrichs 1986).
The idea of tense as anaphora is quite naturally captured in the framework of
Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle 1993) with Presupposition-
as-Anaphora (van der Sandt 1992) (henceforth, DRT+PA).
Let’s use (5), with anaphora in the domains of both person and tense, to
illustrate this framework:
(5) Sheila had a party on Monday. She got drunk.
As a dynamic framework, interpretation happens in a context. We’ll take the
first sentence of (5), represented as in (6), as context:
(6) Sheila had a party on Monday.
x t n
sheila(x)
party(x, t)
t < n
monday(t)
Against this background we can interpret the second sentence. This interpreta-
tion starts by assigning a preliminary structure (henceforth PrelDRS) in which
presuppositions are marked by dashed boxes:
(7) She got drunk.
drunk(y, t′)
y
she(y)
t′
t′ < n
Next we merge the two and try to find antecedents for the presuppositions. The
pronominal presupposition, y, has to bind to a female antecedent, and hence
binds to x. The temporal presupposition, t′, looks for a past time, t:
(8) (6) ⊕ (7) =
x t n
sheila(x)
party(x, t)
t < n
monday(t)
drunk(y, t′)
y
she(y)
t′
t′ < n
;
x t n
sheila(x)
party(x, t)
t < n
monday(t)
drunk(x, t)
In this way we obtain the desired result: she refers back to Sheila and the getting
drunk takes place during the party on Monday.
2.2 Temporal de se interpretation
Like the anaphoric feature of tense, its de se character is best illustrated in anal-
ogy with the domain of person. In the person domain, Perry (1977) introduces
crazy Heimson who thinks he is Hume, to argue against the standard notion of
belief as a propositional attitude. Let’s reconstruct this argument first and then
transfer it to the temporal domain.
(9) Heimson thinks he is Hume.
A straightforward DRT+PA analysis of (9), with an intensional, i.e. proposi-
tional, belief operator belx would yield (10). The pronoun he is bound by Heim-
son and the embedded name Hume is resolved globally.
(10)
x y
heimson(x)
hume(y)
belx
x = y
What’s left in the belief is an equation between variables, rigidly denoting two
different individuals, i.e. a contradiction. Semantically that means that Heim-
son’s belief set is empty and therefore that he believes literally everything. This
is clearly incorrect; Heimson is crazy but not that crazy. Such non-propositional
beliefs about oneself are called de se.
Lewis’ (1979) solution to this problem of de se belief is to reinterpret belief as
the self-ascription of a property, like in (11). Here, bel∗ is a new belief operator,
denoting self-ascription and taking properties as argument. The self-ascribed
property, being Hume, is constructed through λ-abstraction from the proposition-
type embedded DRS. We suggestively use the variable i′ to denote the first
person within the belief, i.e. the cognitive center that does the believing:
(11)
x y
heimson(x)
hume(y)
bel
∗
x
λi′
i′ = y
The same observation has been made for the temporal domain. Say Sam is
confused about when, rather than who, she is. She thinks it’s 10AM when it’s
actually 11AM. Straightforward interpretation of the present tense as denoting
the utterance time n, with a propositional belief-operator again gives the wrong
result:
(12) Sam thinks it is 10AM.
x t n
sam(x)
10am(t)
belx,n
n = t
10AM in (12) names a specific time and ends up in the main DRS. The dedicated
discourse referent n for ‘now’, representing the present tense in both thinks and
is, denotes 11AM. So, semantically, what Sam is said to believe is the absurd
11AM=10AM
By analogy with the Heimson de se problem, we solve this by making the
object of belief a property, now of times, rather than a proposition:
(13)
x t n
sam(x)
10am(t)
bel
∗
x,n
λn′
n′ = t
In (13), Sam ‘now-ascribes’, so to speak, the property of being 10AM, that is,
she locates her subjective now n′ at 10AM.
A second example to illustrate the need for temporal de se representations.
Imagine that today is April 3rd and that Sam is confused about the time, think-
ing it’s April 2nd. Then it may be the case that both (14a) and (14b) are true:
(14) a. Sam thinks Sheila is in London.
b. Sam thinks Sheila is in Paris on April 3.
With belief as propositional attitudes, however, Sam would believe a contradic-
tion, since the beliefs would be represented as (15a) and (15b), respectively:
(15) a.
x y n
sam(x) sheila(y)
belx,n
london(y, n)
b.
x y t n
sam(x) sheila(y)
3april(t)
belx,n
paris(y, t)
Since the utterance time is April 3rd, n = t, the combination of (15a) and (15b)
implies that Sam has the absurd belief about one and the same time, April 3rd,
that Sheila is in London and Paris at that time.
With belief as the self-acription of a property, on the other hand, we can
represent the difference between temporal de se, for (14a), and de re for (14b)
(on account of its overt mention of a specific time):
(16) a.
x y n
sam(x) sheila(y)
bel
∗
x,n
λn′
london(y, n′)
b.
x y n
sam(x) sheila(y)
3april(n)
bel
∗
x,n
λn′
paris(y, n)
According to (16a) Sam now-ascribes the (temporal) property of Sheila being in
London, and in (16b) the belief is really propositional, i.e. equivalent to (15b).3
3 Propositional beliefs can be reformulated in the more powerful property-self-
ascription framework: Sam self-ascribes the property of being temporally located
at some timepoint in a world in which Sheila is in Paris April on 3rd.
2.3 Backward shifted past and mistaken time
In the previous subsections, we have indicated two general features of tense inter-
pretation, anaphoricity and de se interpretation. Now we turn to past-under-past
sentences, sentences with a past tense verb embedded under a past tense atti-
tude verb, like our (1), here repeated for convenience as (17). We show that both
features come together in the backward shifted reading of such sentences.
(17) Sam said that she was in London.
Given the anaphoric nature of tense, let’s first see what a simple anaphoric
account of tense would do with the interpretation of the embedded past tense
in (17). How would the simultaneous and backward shifted reading come about
on such account? It would assign to (17) the prelDRS in (18) with the tense
presupposition in the dashed box:
(18)
x t n
sam(x)
t < n
sayx,t
london(x, t′)
t′
t′ < n
The time of the stay in London t′ looks for a past time and since in (18) t,
the time of the saying, is the only time available, it will bind to this time. The
output is given in (19).
(19)
x t n
sam(x)
t < n
sayx,t
london(x, t)
In this way the stay in London ends up simultaneous with the saying, apparently
capturing the simultaneous reading.
To get the backward shifted reading we must add some context:
(20) Sue asked Sam why she wasn’t at the party on Monday.
t t′′ . . .
party(t′′)
monday(t′′)
t′′ < t < n
ask(t, . . .)
...
If (20) precedes (17), the natural reading of (17) is a backward shifted one. On an
anaphoric account of tense, this is because (20) makes available for t′ a second
time to bind to, the time of the party on Monday, t′′:
(21) (20) ⊕ (18) =
x t t′ t′′ n
party(t′′)
monday(t′′)
t′′ < t < n
...
sam(x)
sayx,t
london(x, t′)
t′
t′ < t
;
x t t′ t′′ n
party(t′′)
monday(t′′)
t′′ < t < n
...
sam(x)
sayx,t
london(x, t′′)
Now let’s evaluate this simple anaphoric analysis. First, (19) is not the correct
representation of the simultaneous reading of (17), since following the reasoning
of section 2.2 with respect to (14a), the present tense equivalent to (17), it follows
that the simultaneous reading is really a de se reading, as in (22):
(22)
x t n
sam(x)
t < n
say
∗
x,t
λi′λn′
london(i′, n′)
Sam ascribes to her self and now the property of being in London. In other
words, she says ‘I am now in London’. In order to derive (22), one has to assume
a “sequence of tense” rule, since the embedded past tense is not interpreted as a
past, but rather as a present, be it a local/narrow one, n′. To obtain this result,
one can follow von Stechow (1995) in that the binding of tenses by attitude verbs
involves a system of morphological feature deletion.
What about the backward shifted reading? In analogy with the simultaneous
reading, we expect that it should be represented like the de se (23) rather than
the de re (21):
(23)
x t n
sam(x)
t < n
say
∗
x,t
λi′λn′
t′
t′ < n′
london(i′, t′)
To see the difference between the two representations we must have a mistaken
time scenario:
Sam was invited to Sheila’s party in Paris, but she didn’t show up.
She mistakenly thought the party was on Tuesday, when she happened
to be in London, but it was actually on Monday. Sheila asked her on
Wednesday why she wasn’t at the party.
Schematically:
Monday, t′′ Tuesday, t′ Wednesday, t Thursday, n
party mistaken party question now
Paris London
Let’s compare (21), the representation provided by the simple anaphoric
account, and (23), the de se representation, for the interpretation of (17) in
this scenario. The purely anaphoric (21) is incorrect, since Sam does not make
a statement about the actual time of the party, Monday. That particular time
does not play any role in her subjective experience. She would never answer
that she was in London at t′′ (Monday) because she wasn’t—she’s not confused
about where she was when, only about the time of the party. The de se (23),
on the other hand, correctly captures this feature by locating the time of the
stay in London in the answer, t′, in the past of Sam’s subjective now n′. The
anaphoric element, however, is missing. Sam’s utterance is given as an answer
to Sheila’s question and hence should relate to the party. Therefore the stay in
London should not just be located at some arbitrary time in the past of Sam’s
subjective now, as currently happens in (23).
Intuitively, what we would like to do is to bind t′, the time of the stay in
London, to the time of the party as represented in Sam’s belief worlds. In that
way we would capture both the anaphoric and the de se feature of the inter-
pretion of the embedded past tense. Even if we would represent Sam’s mistaken
beliefs about the party in the context DRS, however, this would be impossible
in standard DRT. The reason is that the time of the party as represented in
her belief worlds would not be accessible to bind to, since it would be embedded
under an attitude operator. The next section provides a solution to this problem.
3 Towards a dynamic analysis
In the prevous section we have seen that two conflicting features, anaphoricity
and de se interpretation, come together in the case of the backward shifted
interpretation of past-under-past sentences. In this section we propose to account
for this observation using an extension of DRT where interpretation consists
of updates of the common ground while also keeping track of the changing,
complex attitudinal states of the various agents (Kamp 1990, 2006). The idea is
that the content of Sam’s answer in (17) is to be evaluated with respect to her
contextually given background belief, which contains her (mistaken) idea of a
party on Tuesday. On such a view, interpretation is modeled as an update that
combines the main DRSs’ conditions, but that also merges each of an agent’s
individual attitude representations.To achieve this we need representations of an
agent’s total attitudinal state: a ‘layered’ DRS (Geurts and Maier 2003).
In section 3.1 we start with the idea of layered attitudes, followed by the
mechanism of embedded updates in section 3.2. Finally, in section 3.3 we show
how these two extensions to DRT allow us to deal with the combination of
anaphoricity and de se binding as found in the backward shifted reading of
past-under-past sentences.
3.1 Attitudes in Layers
If we want to have an anaphoric account of tense under attitudes, we must take
into account the interaction of different attitudes (we’ve already encountered
two distinct attitudes, believing and saying) and presuppositions. As it happens,
belief is rather special among the attitudes in that presuppositions triggered in
any attitude report tend to end up in the ascribee’s beliefs (Karttunen 1974,
Heim 1992).
Take the hope report in (24), containing the presupposition trigger her rival.
Note, by the way, that in this subsection and the next we ignore the independent
issue of de se representation, i.e. for the sake of simplicity, we’ll represent atti-
tudes as propositional rather than in terms of the self-ascription of properties):
(24) Sheila hopes her rival will be hit by a truck.4
x
sheila(x)
hopex
hit by truck(y)
y
rival(y)
4 Example from Henk Zeevat.
Now, this could in principle be a de re report, paraphrasable as: she hopes that
that guy (who we know is her rival, perhaps unbeknownst to her) will be hit by
a truck. We derive this reading by global resolution of the presupposition:
(25)
x y
sheila(x)
rival(y)
hopex
hit by truck(y)
More interesting is the de dicto reading, as in ‘I hope my rival (whoever it
is) will be hit by a truck’. This reading is not so easily represented. We might
try a local accommodation of the presupposition:
(26)
x
sheila(x)
hopex
y
rival(y)
hit by truck(y)
(26) reads as ‘Sheila hopes that she has a rival and that he will be hit by a truck’.
But of course Sheila doesn’t hope that she has a rival. That she has a rival is
part of her belief rather than her hope. Her hope is restricted to the condition
that this person be hit by a truck. In other words, Sheila hopes of whoever she
believes to be her rival that he will be hit by a truck. This dependency of hope
and other attitudes on belief (cf. Asher 1987) motivates the representation of an
agent’s total attitudinal state as a complex DRS with different ‘compartments’
for the different attitudes.
We propose to formalize this using Geurts and Maier’s (2003) Layered DRT.
This very general framework is meant to represent the interaction of different
kinds of content, by splitting a DRS into layers connected by shared discourse ref-
erents. The ‘kinds of content’ here are the different attitudes and the ‘interaction’
is the observed asymmetric dependency between, for instance, hope and belief.
More specifically, in the proposed framework, a complex attitude representation
is a Layered DRS (LDRS) consisting of a set of (‘narrow’) discourse referents
common to all attitudes, and conditions making up the various attitudes (belief,
hope, assert, . . . ) about these attitude-internal objects. These conditions are la-
belled according to the attitude they belong to (bel, hope, say, . . . ). Instead of
a belief operator we now need a general ‘complex attitude’ operator.5 For our
example, this gives:
(27)
x
sheila(x)
attx
ybel
rivalbel(y)
hit by truckhope(y)
The purely attitude-internal discourse referent y shows that we are dealing with
a de dicto interpretation. This y, moreover, is shared between the hope and belief
layer to capture the fact that Sheila’s hope, that he be hit by a truck, is about
the same narrow individual that she believes is her rival.
3.2 Embedded Updates
In order to deal with the dynamics of attitude ascriptions we need a further
modification of the DRT framework: the update mechanism needs to be extended
to cover merges of attitude embedded DRSs.
Let (24) (on the de dicto reading) continue as in (28):
(28) [Sheila hopes her rival will be hit by a truck.] But she fears he won’t be.
Intuitively, he picks up the rival of the first sentence. However, if we were to use
the standard DRT+PA common ground update, i.e. merge context and prelim-
inary DRS, we would only get to (29):
(29) (27) ⊕ (28) =
x
sheila(x)
attx
ybel
rivalbel(y)
hit by truckhope(y)
attx
¬hit by truckfear(z)
z
he(z)
5 The exact semantics of this operator will have to wait until another occasion. The
idea is that a model associates with an individual a set of belief alternative worlds
(or rather, contexts), a set of hope alternatives, a set of say alternatives, etc. We
then compute the proposition expressed by the LDRS’s belief layer as to see if it
includes the set of belief alternatives. Next, the belief layer’s conditions are used to
create an anchor against which, finally, the other layers can be evaluated and their
propositions can be compared with the corresponding attitude’s set of alternatives.
If we were now to resolve the presupposition along its accessibility path, we
would be unable to bind it. The intended antecedent y is not accessible because
it is embedded under an attitude operator. We would end up with a DRS that
ascribes two distinct attitudes to Sheila, missing the fact that she has a fear
about the hypothetical rival in her belief worlds.
It is for this reason that we propose to update each agent’s attitudinal state
along with the common ground, following Asher (1986), among others. That is,
we merge not only the top-level of the DRS, but also the two attitude represen-
tations ascribed to Sheila, before resolving the embedded presupposition:
(30) ;
x
sheila(x)
attx
ybel
rivalbel(y)
hit by truckhope(y)
¬hit by truckfear(z)
z
he(z)
;
x
sheila(x)
attx
ybel
rivalbel(y)
hit by truckhope(y)
¬hit by truckfear(y)
Thus, we can bind z to a local antecedent from the previous sentence, so that
Sheila indeed hopes that her rival (whoever he is) is hit by a truck and fears he
is not. In the next section we apply this mechanism to reconcile the anaphoricity
of tense with the locality of de se interpretation.6
3.3 Mistaken past revisited
We now return to the challenge at hand, the backwards shifted past. Recall
from 2.3 that in order to capture both the anaphoric and the de se feature of
the embedded past tense of (17) we want to bind the time of Sam’s stay in
6 The anaphoric accessibility problem posed by (28) is reminiscent of Geach’s (1967)
Hob-Nob puzzle of intentional identity:
(i) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare and Nob wonders whether she
killed Cob’s sow.
The pronoun she in the second conjunct has to pick up the witch narrowly introduced
under a belief operator in the first conjunct. The crucial difference between this and
(28) is that here an anaphoric dependency is supposed to hold between different
attitudes of different agents. This more general problem of intentional identity is
therefore not solved by our embedded update mechanism which only combines the
different attitudes of a single agent to fix anaphoric dependencies within that indi-
vidual’s complex attitudinal state. On the other hand, note that a solution to the
general problem of intentional identity could probably be applied for our purposes
below. Unfortunately, we are unaware of an elegant and satisfactory solution to the
Hob-Nob and related puzzles.
London to the time of the party as represented in her belief worlds – something
that was impossible in standard DRT+PA. The new machinery, layered attitudes
and embedded updates, proposed in the previous subsections, however, enable
us to do achieve this, as we will show now.
First we represent the context containing the relevant background informa-
tion from our mistaken identity scenario. Note that at this point we don’t (have
to) know about the stay in London, as that is what (17) will contribute, but
we (i.e. the reporter and her audience – not necessarily including either Sam or
Sheila) do know about Sam’s mistaken assumption about the day of the party.
Also, from here on we take the de se character of attitudes with respect to tenses
into account again. The relevant context in our enhanced DRT+PA looks like
(31):
(31)
x t t′′ n
sam(x)
t′′ < t < n
monday(t′′)
party(t′′)
attx,tλi
′λn′
t′bel
tuesdaybel(t
′)
partybel(t
′)
t′ <bel n
′
...
...
The compositionally derived preliminary representation for the backwards shifted
reading of (17) involves a past tense presupposition, more specifically, one that
is past with respect to Sheila’s local now, n′. Simply adding it to the context in
(31), and performing the initial resolutions, gives:
(32)
x t t′′ n
sam(x)
t′′ < t < n
monday(t′′)
party(t′′)
attx,tλi
′λn′
t′bel
tuesdaybel(t
′)
partybel(t
′)
t′ <bel n
′
...
...
attx,tλi
′λn′
londonsay(i
′, t′′′)
t′′′
t′′′ < n′
At this point we could bind t′′′ to t′′, the actual time of the party, but this
wouldn’t give the intended interpretation (see section 2.3). The desired result
would be obtained by binding t′′′ to t′, the time of the party according to
Sam’s belief. That would capture the intuition that t′′′, the time of the asserted
stay in London, coincides with Sam’s idea of when the party was, i.e. Tuesday.
Currently t′ is not accessible for t′′′ to bind to. But according to the extended
merge and update mechanism of 3.2 we can merge the representations of Sam’s
two attitudes and bind t′′′ narrowly yet truly anaphorically to t′, Sam’s internal
representation of the time of the party:
(33) ;
x t t′′ n
sam(x)
t′′ < t < n
monday(t′′)
party(t′′)
...
attx,tλi
′λn′
t′bel
tuesdaybel(t
′)
partybel(t
′)
t′ <bel n
′
...
londonsay(i
′, t′′′)
t′′′
t′′′ < n′
;
x t t′′ n
sam(x)
t′′ < t < n
monday(t′′)
party(t′′)
...
attx,tλi
′λn′
t′bel
tuesdaybel(t
′)
partybel(t
′)
t′ <bel n
′
...
londonsay(i
′, t′)
In this final output, Sam’s stay in London given as reason for her absence indeed
falls on the day she thinks there is a party, t′, not the actual day of the party,
t′′. Through property self-ascription, presupposition-as-anaphora, Layered DRT,
complex attitudinal states, and embedded merge we have thus arrived at a cor-
rect analysis of the backward shifted past.
4 Conclusion
The tension created by the independently motivated anaphoric and de se aspects
of tense interpretation is resolved by an extension of DRT in which updates of the
common ground are accompanied by updates of each relevant agent’s complex
attitudinal state. This is necessary in order to deal with the backward shifted
reading of the past-under-past. In such constructions the embedded past tense is
at the same time anaphoric to a salient past time in the context and de se, that
is, narrow with respect to the attitude in which it occurs. The extended update
mechanism lets the past tense be anaphoric to a narrow, de se antecedent in
some earlier attitude in the context.
References
Asher, N.: Belief in discourse representation theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic
15(2) (1986) 127–189
Asher, N.: A typology for attitude verbs and their anaphoric properties. Linguistics
and Philosophy 10(2) (1987) 125–197
Geach, P.: Intentional identity Journal of Philosophy 74 (1967) 627–632
Geurts, B., Maier, E.: Layered DRT. ms (2003)
Heim, I.: Presupposition projection and the semantics of attitude verbs. Journal of
Semantics 9 (1992) 183–221
Hinrichs, E.: Temporal anaphora and discourses of English. Linguistics and Philosophy
9 (1986) 63–82
Kamp, H.: Prolegomena to a structural account of belief and other attitudes. In
Anderson, C.A., Owens, J., eds.: Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in
Logic, Language, and Mind. Center for the Study of Language and Information,
Stanford, California (1990)
Kamp, H., Reyle, U.: From Discourse to Logic: an Introduction to Modeltheoretic Se-
mantics in Natural Language, Formal Logic and Discourse Representation Theory.
Volume 1. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht (1993)
Kamp, H.: Temporal reference inside and outside propositional attitudes. In von
Heusinger, K., Turner, K., eds.: Where Semantics Meets Pragmatics. Volume 16 of
Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface. Elsevier (2006) 439–472
Karttunen, L.: Presupposition and linguistic context. Theoretical Linguistics (1974)
181–194
Lewis, D.: Attitudes de dicto and de se. The Philosophical Review 88 (1979) 513–543
Partee, B.: Some structural analogies between tenses and pronouns in English. Journal
of Philosophy 70 (1973) 601–609
Partee, B.H.: Nominal and temporal anaphora. Linguistics and Philosophy 7 (1984)
243–286
Perry, J.: Frege on demonstratives. The Philosophical Review 86(4) (1977) 474–497
van der Sandt, R.: Presupposition projection as anaphora resolution. Journal of Se-
mantics 9 (1992) 333–377
von Stechow, A.: On the proper treatment of tense. In Simons, M., Galloway, T., eds.:
Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory V, Ithaca, New York, Cornell
University (1995) 362–386
